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Abstract: In the first part, a first exploration is 
made on the issue of sayability and unsayability 
using conceptual and investigative resources 
taken from the phenomenological descriptions 
made by Husserl in Ideas I. A first and still 
broad result is reached, namely, that any 
Erlebnis (lived experience), taken in its fullness 
and plenitude, is ineffable, and therefore, life 
itself, because it is only a stream of lived expe-
riences, as it is lived at each and every mo-
ment, is unsayable, ineffable. The limit of lin-
guistic expression referred to in the title is, 
thus, its impossibility to express a full Erlebnis. 
Then, linguistic expression is examined against 
the background of the plenitude of this life that 
it cannot express but from which and in which it 
emerges, and this inspection brings to light in a 
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Resumen: En la primera parte, se hace una 
primera exploración del tema de la decibilidad y 
la indecibilidad empleando recursos metodoló-
gicos y conceptuales tomados de las descripcio-
nes fenomenológicas hechas por Husserl en 
Ideas I. Con ello se alcanza un primer resultado 
todavía muy amplio, a saber, que toda vivencia 
(Erlebnis), tomada en su integridad y plenitud, 
es inefable, y por tanto, la vida misma, puesto 
que consiste en una corriente de vivencias, tal 
como es vivida en todos y cada uno de sus 
instantes, es precisamente inefable, indecible. 
El límite de la expresión lingüística a que el 
título se refiere es, pues, su imposibilidad para 
expresar una vivencia plena. Luego, se examina 
la expresión lingüística contra el fondo de la 
plenitud de la vida que no puede expresar pero 
de la cual y en la cual emerge, y esta inspec-
ción trae a luz de manera preliminar los diver-
sos horizontes que la circundan. 
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In an unpublished manuscript, José Gaos, who was among other things the 
translator into Spanish of Husserl’s Ideas I and Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
among many other works, posed the following challenge: “All philosophy 
requires a theory of what is sayable and of the ways to say it. This theory must 
admit that not all is definable, not even sayable; that not all can be stated with 
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precision. That many things cannot but be narrated, suggested narratively”1. It 
is not sure, although it is highly probable, that this challenge was posed 
precisely to Phenomenology. In any case, I think Phenomenology is not only 
able to respond to it, but that it has already given a response to certain parts of 
the challenge. I will start my communication with a reflection on the very first 
part of the challenge, which, as far as I know, is still unanswered. Then, 
perhaps moved by the peculiar dialectical relationship between limit and 
horizon, I attempt to view, from the limit of linguistic expression, into the 
horizon that it itself makes visible. Of course, not all details in Gaos’s challenge 
will be responded or even dealt with. But it will be clear, at least, that if an 
essential unsayability (inexpressibility or ineffability) can be ascertained, it 





Husserl wrote, in effect: “Actually man does not ‘express’ all his psychic life 
in language; nor is he ever able to do so” 2 . But he left these words 
unexplained. Now, the obvious verification of the fact that we cannot express 
all our inner life in language is not of much interest here. It is the impossibility 
to do that, but only if it is an essential impossibility, what may define an 
essential unsayability or ineffability. Our first goal will be to bring out this 
essential impossibility to express all of our Seelenleben in language. 
We don’t need to go further than Ideas I, at least for a first approach. Here 
we read: “anything meant in the noematic sense (and, more particularly, as the 
noematic core) pertaining to any act, no matter which, is expressible by means 
of ‘significations’”3.  
 
 
1 The manuscript, from about 1938, is in page 36277, folder 37 (2nd. Fund) of José Gaos Archives in the 
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Mexico. 
2 “Nicht alles Seelenleben ‘drückt’ der Mensch wirklich in der Sprache aus und kann er je durch sie 
ausdrücken” (Formale und transzendentale Logik. Verzuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft, 
Husserliana – Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke, Vol. XVII, edited by Paul Janssen, Den Haag: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1874; § 3, p. 26. I will refer to this series as “Hua”, followed by the volume number. 
The translation is from Formal and Transcendental Logic. Translated by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, p. 22). 
3 Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. Translat-
ed by Fred Kersten. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 295. (German original: 
Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine 
Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (Hua III/1). Edited by Karl Schuhmann. Den Haag, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1976, § 124, p. 286.)  
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Over the basic stratum of acts (acts which of course, as well as “all 
intentive mental processes”, have already a sense, a more or less explicated 
sense), the stratum of signification (or of expression, since “Logical signification 
is an expression”)4 —a stratum of two sides, the sensuous or corporeal side 
(the verbal sound) and the “mental” side (the signification proper)— has as its 
property that it makes the sense of the basic act, or its “noematic core”, 
together with its reference to an objectivity, adopt the peculiar form of 
“conceptuality”, of “universality”. 
Husserl comments how little justice has been done “in the current 
literature” to the “major problems” concerning “how expressive mental 
processes are related to the non-expressive ones, and what the latter undergo 
in supervining expressing”5. We all can easily notice the space, or we could call 
it the hiatus, that lies between the sense of the singular perception of a flying 
blackbird and the signification or meaning confined in the expression “There 
flies a blackbird!”, as in the well-known example of the 6th Logical 
Investigation. It is in this space where an essential unsayability can be 
uncovered. 
It is noteworthy that it is defined as an “incompleteness”: an 
incompleteness “which belongs to the essence of expression as expression, that 
is, to its universality”6. All lived experiences or mental processes, all acts, are 
individual, singular, and all expression is universal. But why or how this renders 
the expression incomplete? In a key passage, Husserl tries to clarify the 
situation: 
 
It is inherent in the sense of the universality belonging to the essence of expressing 
that all the particulars of the expressed can never be reflected in the expression. 
The stratum of signifying is not, and of essential necessity cannot be, a kind of 
reduplication of the substratum. Whole dimensions of variability in the substratum 
do not enter at all into the expressive signifying; they, or their correlates, do not 
indeed ‘express themselves’ at all: thus the modifications of relative clarity and 





5 Ibid., p. 296. (Hua III/1, p. 287.) 
6 Ibid., pp. 299-300. (Hua III/1, p. 291.)  
7 Ibid. 
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The expressed (the substratum) is, of course, the lived experience or 
“intentive mental process” (in German, the intentionales Erlebnis), as for 
instance the perception of the blackbird in its flight. And now we are taken to 
understand that not all parts or particulars of the Erlebnis can be expressed 
while it is expressed, or that it is not expressed in its completeness; that what 
is “really” expressed is only a part of it, however important it may be. This part 
is called, in the quotation above, the “noematic sense”, or, “more particularly”, 
the “noematic core”. Husserl characterizes it as “the object in the How of its 
determinations” —so, it is the object as it is precisely determined while being 
meant 8 . I will not enter here into the discussion about the nature and 
composition of this “noematic core” (or of the noema itself), or specifically 
about its concreteness or abstractness9. In any case, this part of the Erlebnis is 
the only one to which the expression adapts itself “and raises [...] to the realm 
of ‘Logos’, of the conceptual and, on that account, the ‘universal’”10. Besides 
this “noematic core”, there remains in the Erlebnis functioning as substratum 
what we can call an unexpressed residuum. The examples of parts belonging to 
this residuum that Husserl mentions (“the modifications of relative clarity and 
distinctness, the attentional modifications, and so forth”) are all noetic parts or 
features, but they, or some of them, include of course hyletic content also. All 
these ingredients in the unexpressed residuum, and many others still not 
mentioned, remain all along the expressing process exactly what they were 
without it: temporal, individual, real ingredients (reell) of the Erlebnis. But it is 
important to stress that Husserl explicitly mentions also “their correlates”. The 
noesis, or the nuclear noesis (the noetic core of the Erlebnis), is always 
accompanied by other noetic elements or parts, and correspondingly, the 
nuclear noema, the noematic core (and, respectively, in the last instance, also 
the object to which it refers or which it “contains”) is always accompanied by 
other noematic features (and the object, respectively, by objective or ontic 
ones), too many to be easily recounted, and also all of them, or most of them 
at least, individual. 
 
 
8 Ibid., § 131, p. 314. (Hua III/1, p. 303.) 
9 I think this question has been settled once and for all by Roberto Walton in “El noema como entidad 
abstracta” (Análisis filosófico IX, No. 2, 1989, pp. 119-137). 
10 Ideas, p. 295. 
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If we remain in the sphere of reality (Realität) —which is the sphere in 
which Husserl also remains in the first place, at least according to the examples 
he uses—, the noematic core, or the object it includes, is always something 
individual, and this individuality can be easily and clearly put in contrast with 
the universality of the expression to which Husserl refers. But we must keep in 
mind that it is first and foremost the individuality, or better, the singularity, of 
the Erlebnis itself what is at stake in the contrast with the universality of 
expression. The individuation of the real object is a secondary individuation 
derived from consciousness11. Furthermore, the real or mundane object is an 
intentional (and in this sense “ideal”) unity against the multiplicity of the 
Erlebnisse in which it is constituted. This allows us to see that what Husserl is 
saying about the incompleteness of the expression, and the elevation of the 
noematic sense to the conceptual and the universal, is valid also for Erlebnisse 
which are directed to ideal or universal objects, and not only for Erlebnisse 
directed to what is real. Also in the expression of a mathematical theorem there 
is an unexpressed residuum. 
Thus, in the case of Erlebnisse directed to real objects, not only the 
individuality of the Erlebnis, but also that of the object is not fetched in the 
expression, and it can never be. It is also not altered or distorted; the elevation 
to the universality leaves it untouched. Individuality can even be recognized, as 
in an occasional expression which may say, for instance, “That blackbird is now 
flying around[...]” etc. An individual blackbird is there for the perception, but its 
individuality —and precisely as the individuality it has for this very perception, 
not as a presumed objective individuality— embraces much more that the fact 
that it is a blackbird flying around with such and such features, and therefore 
the expression we just forged could be used to refer to many other individual 
and different blackbirds. The expression of the perception “respects” only the 
noematic core or the objective sense of the perception in which a certain 
determination of the object, a “core” determination, so to say, is enclosed. But 
 
 
11 “Absolute individuation enters into the personal Ego. The surrounding world of the Ego acquires its 
individuation essentially by way of its relation to the Ego that has experience of it and that exchanges its 
experience with other individuals. For each Ego, any thing has the here and now as correlate of intui-
tion.” (Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Se-
cond Book (known as Ideas II). Translated by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer, Edmund Husserl Collected 
Works, Vol. III, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, § 64, p. 315. German 
original: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch: 
Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Hua IV). Edited by Marly Biemel. Haag: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1952, p. 301). 
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for consciousness, for the subject of this consciousness, the objects, or its 
individuality or its individual situation, is always determined, over its mere core 
determination, by countless other features and elements which compose what 
Husserl calls the “full noema”12. This is the correlate of a “full noesis”, or, as we 
can also say, of a “full Erlebnis” (a full lived experience). Therefore, it is this full 
noema what is, as such, inexpressible. Or, if we rather refer the expression to 
the Erlebnis, not to the noematic object, we would then say that it is the full 
Erlebnis, with its full noesis, what is, as such, inexpressible. 
This restriction of the expression to the noematic core of an Erlebnis goes 
hand in hand with another, perhaps more drastic, restriction. This second 
restriction will help to round up the thesis of the unsayability, or ineffability or 
inexpressibility (I take these three terms as synonyms, since I restrict myself in 
this essay to linguistic expression) of the Erlebnisse as they are lived, or, as we 
can already say, of life as it is concretely lived. When discussing expression, 
Husserl refers explicitly only to acts, and not to all intentive lived experiences, 
not to all intentionale Erlebnisse. This is clear in the quotation above: “anything 
meant in the noematic sense (and, more particularly, as the noematic core) 
pertaining to any act, no matter which, is expressible by means of 
‘significations’ [...]”13. Expression itself, or expressing, is also an act, or “a 
particular act-stratum”, to which “all other acts are to conform”14. Acts, as we 
know, are actual Erlebnisse, that is, those that are executed by the I (or the 
ego), those in which the I is, in a rather literal sense, “present”. Not all acts are 
expressed (and sometimes they even cannot be expressed, like those lived by 
non-human animals), but every expression is expression of an act... Now, as 
far as the realm of inactuality or, as Kersten translates, non-actionality, is also 
a realm of potentiality, all non-actional mental processes are also expressible 
given their previous conversion into acts. But as far as they remain non-
actional, they remain outside the reach of expression. And it turns out that 
every act, every actional Erlebnis, is “surrounded by a ‘halo’ of non-actional 
mental processes; the stream of mental processes can never consist of just 
 
 
12 See for instance, in the same work, the brief characterization of the full noema in § 90. In Kersten 
translation, pp. 217-218. 
13 Other passages corroborate this claim: see the first line of § 124 of Ideas I: “Interwoven with all the 
acts considered before are the expressive act-strata...” (ibid., p. 294; Hua III/1, p. 284.). See also the 
quotation that follows immediately in the text. 
14 Ideas I, p. 295; Hua III/1, p. 286. 
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actionalities”15 . Thus, in the very moment of expressing, this halo of non-
actional mental processes, which surrounds the expressed act, is not and 
cannot be expressed. This halo, which is also called the horizon of the act, can 
of course be considered, in a certain sense, as a part of the act which is 
expressed, a part which lies, as is clear, outside its noematic core, thus in the 
full noema —or belong to the full combination of noemas of all noesis present in 
a single Erlebnis in the living present of the I. 
As long as during our entire life we never live only in noetic cores or in 
nuclear Erlebnisse (if this notion has a sense at all), with only a noematic core 
as noema, but always in full Erlebnisse, with full noesis and full noemas, then it 
is clear that life, just as we live it at every moment of our lives, is inexpressible. 
The answer that Phenomenology can give to Gaos’s question, an answer that 
derives in a very simple way from Husserl’s exposition of expression in Ideas I, 
is that it is life what is unsayable, just life as it is concretely lived by an 
individual subject in its living present, and together with it its correlate, just as 
it is its correlate, individualized in a certain sense by it and with its own 
correlative horizons: be it a blackbird, a tree in a meadow, a crowded street, 
the theorem of Pitagoras, the center of the Sun or whatever16. 
Perhaps I should try to make you see all this with much more accuracy, 
and, above all, to give you a better insight into what a full Erlebnis really is —as 
seen from a Phenomenological point of view—, and how it involves, or implies, 
or carries with it, the whole stream of Erlebnisse from which it is only a part or 
a stretch, or, as Husserl says, how “every singular Erlebnis ‘reflects’ the whole 
nexus of Erlebnisse”17. But there is no time to follow here this path. I assume 
every one of us can easily evoke the pertinent Husserlian analyses and have a 
good inkling of the way in which the myriad of intentional lines, rays, 
dimensions, horizons, habitualities, passivities, inactualities, motivations, 
associations, genesis, implications, attitudes, etcetera, etcetera, gather all in a 
single Erlebnis or in a single stretch of a life, to make it concretely and uniquely 
what it is. I have taken from the writings of Eugene T. Gendlin the word 
 
 
15 Ibid., p. 72; Hua III/1, p. 73. 
16 It remains to be examined if the ineffability I am expounding here is the only ineffability that Phenom-
enology can ascertain, or if there are other kinds of ineffabilities that cannot be subsumed under this one 
or reduced to this one, as I conjecture. This is a matter for further research. 
17 Erster Philosophie (1923/24), Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion (Hua VIII). 
Edited by Rudolf Boehm. Haag: Nijhoff, 1959, p. 318. 
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“intricacy” to refer to the fact that a Erlebnis of whatever kind and type, found 
in a stream of intentional consciousness, is situated in an infinitely or 
indefinitely complex intertwinement and interplay of an indefinite, if not infinite, 
number of lived moments, elements, features and factors of many kinds. 
Husserl uses in many places the word “Erlebniszusammenhang” (as in the 
quotation just made), not always in the holistic sense I am hinting at, but he 
also uses, in a much more similar sense, “Verflechtung” (“entanglement” or 
“interlacing”), and in one place also “Getriebe” (“gearing”) 18 . Although he 
undoubtedly recognizes this intricacy of every act, at every moment, in or 
within a formidable nexus of non-actual Erlebnisse, it is clear in his writings that 
he is much more interested in emphasizing the individuality and personality of 
the I of the acts, of the active life, as a unity that can be expressed and known 
and explored according to its type, against all his non-actual or non-active life 
of his habitualities and passivities, or against the very stream of Erlebnisse. To 
take a simple example, he writes in Ideas II: 
 
Everything indeed has its effects, though not in all respects. On the streets, people 
meet me, cars pass, etc. This has its apperceptive type, within which the bustle of 
the street is contained, whereas the individual event, instead of occurring in this 
way, can always also occur differently. All this singularities, which I hardly notice 
but which predelineate the horizon of my lived experience, do not in the least alter 
my moral character or my aesthetic character. As regards these spheres, no 
motivations flow from there.19   
 
He stresses also that the I “has its peculiarity not in the sense of the 
Einmaligkeit (the irrepeatibility)”, as if it were “individualized” only because of 
the flux of his Erlebnisse (or the Verflechtung). On the contrary, this I has an 
“individual peculiarity”, the product of a peculiar genesis that gives him unity, 
seclusiveness, personal character, freedom, etc.20. Nevertheless, he (the I) is 
non-independent with respect to a stream of Erlebnisse, as this stream is also 
non-independent with respect to him. And in this stream every Erlebnis that 
can be delimited have a “background”, a “horizon”, and also a “hidden life”, and 
 
 
18 Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass, Erster Teil: 1905-1920 (Hua 
XIII). Edited by Iso Kern, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973; p. 467: “...rein phänomenologischen 
noetischen-noematischen Verflechtungen...”; “...das ‘innere’ Getriebe...”. 
19 Ideas II, p. 284; Hua IV, p. 271. 
20 See Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass, Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928 
(Hua XIV). Edited by Iso Kern, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 22-23, and 34. 
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what is “hidden, ‘unconscious’, is a proper mode for monadic latencies”21. Even 
if the I, being unique, cannot be properly called einmalig, the stream of his 
Erlebnisse, and also each and every one of them, undoubtedly are. This 
Einmaligkeit is a sort of uniqueness, a uniqueness due to the intricacy, and it is 
this uniqueness what makes the inexpressibility unavoidable. 
Now, even if the individuality of the I of the monad is not the same (and 
does not pertain to the same category) as the individuality or uniqueness of its 
life and, above all, of every one of his Erlebnisse, I think nothing talks against 
the application to both or all of them of the classic dictum Individuum est 
ineffabile, whose precise phenomenological meaning we would be uncovering. 
But, on the other hand, the ineffability revealed here is surely not what 
Philosophy, or Literature or the theory of Literature or of Art in general, or the 
philosophical considerations of mysticism, have had in view along the centuries. 
It is also not that ineffability (and I cannot say much more about it) that 
constantly awakes the suspicions of the philosophers of language or the 
philosophers of anthropology or the theoreticians of the human sciences, 
because of its links with skepticism, or subjectivism, relativism, or with a 
cultural or social or, worst, ethical, narcissism, of all of which we are still in a 
desperate need of liberation. It is just the sober —and, indeed, not at all 
surprising— verification that the idea of raising to a universal, and thus 
intersubjective, concept any full Erlebnis (or, simplifying, any full noema) is 
nonsense. 
Even if this ineffability is, so to say, in the palm of the hand, in a certain 
sense “present” in every living present of a life, as a latent “character” of every 
single Erlebnis, be it otherwise expressed or not, it does not make itself 
apparent or visible, at least in normal situations. And together with this 
invisibility or inadvertency, and even perhaps linked with it in a way still to be 
examined, there is the fact that it, also at least in normal situations, makes not 
itself felt by an opposing or pressing will or urge to express (or to say or to 
speak)... In the normal or regular linguistic interchange among individuals, we 
cannot find a wish or a will to express, and therefore to communicate, the 
whole plentiful abundance of our full Erlebnisse, even if, due to a sort of 
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life. We do not need to appeal, for the time being, to the extraordinary, the 
exceptional, the abnormal personalities, even if they are called the poet, the 
saint, the mystic, the genius, or the mad. Be what it may with the richness of 
their lives, and, on the other hand, with their capabilities of reflection or 
introspection, of inner insight or illumination, none of them would be in a better 
position than the ordinary man (the man in the street) regarding the possibility 
of rendering any one of their full Erlebnisse to linguistic expression. We can 
remember here the words of Adolf Reinach: “Even the poorest conscious life is 
too rich to be fully grasped by his subject”.  
I do not deny, of course, that it is not at all an uncommon experience to 
feel a sort of despair or anger at the impossibility to put in words the vital 
situation in which we find ourselves at the moment, or the particular mixture of 
feelings that we are entertaining, or other similar, usually strongly felt 
verifications of the limit of linguistic expression; and of course I think that 
many of these experiences of ineffability are just crude manifestations of the 
ineffability that I am trying to show here. But it is important to distinguish 
between a certain, also more or less common, difficulty to talk about some 
particular feeling, emotion, mood, mental state, be it natural or provoked by 
some drug, or any other kind of particular Erlebnis that we might have, no 
matter how rare, or strange, or exceptional we might find it, because we cannot 
find a name for it, because we are lacking in words, and, on the other hand, the 
true ineffability of life or of a single full Erlebnis in a life. The key of the 
distinction is always this question: is what is looking for expression in language 
some feature or some part or side of the Erlebnis, however dense, or hard, or 
weighty it is or it seems, or it is the full Erlebnis? What I said above is only 
that, in normal situations, full Erlebnisse just don’t look for expression in 
language. Tacitly, we all (normally) “know” that language is not “made” for 
them. But to discriminate precisely what it is and what it is not a full Erlebnis, a 
certain phenomenological eye is useful. 
As for the linguistic expression of partial Erlebnisse, of partial moments or 
features or phenomena of our life —feelings, pains, aches (“moral” or 
“physical”), aspirations, remorses, nostalgias, joys, rages, enthusiasms, 
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melancholies, spleens, boredoms, loathings, etc. [...]—22, I am convinced it is 
always possible to submit them to linguistic expression, just because its 
intersubjective identification is always possible, and in many cases with the 
help of language. Here the question is if it is conceivable that others undergo or 
live the same kind of experience (even if it is only a thought-experience or a 
thought-experiment). 
But, alas, we all live our partial Erlebnisse, or partial moments of 
Erlebnisse, those that I just deemed as expressible, in the middle of our 
intricacy, of our inexpressible life. The question arises as to how is this possible, 
that is, how can we express something at all, if everything is lived (as an 
Erlebnis or as a correlate of an Erlebnis) within an inexpressible life. The 
answer, in its most succinct (and superficial) form, is already given: 
conceptualizing, raising in expressive acts to the realm of the logos and the 
universal the noematic cores of other certain acts; we all learn to do this 
without any reflection when we learn to speak. But this very quick answer hides 
in fact the real complexity of this process. The problem of the conditions of 
possibility of linguistic expression implies the whole problematic of the structure 
of subjectivity or, in other words, the multidimensional and multilayered 
problem of the self-constitution of a transcendental monad in Husserl’s sense. 
It involves —to mention the most obvious, as a brief recount of what I will not 
study in this paper— the issue of prepredicative (prelinguistic) experience23, 
where the genesis of language starts, and then the whole theme of 
intersubjectivity, and in connection with it, what has been called the 
communicative intention24. But, in my view, the main issue presupposed by the 
emergence of linguistic expression in the life of a consciousness, is the splitting 
of this life into a passive/non-actual and an active/actual levels; this is, in other 
 
 
22 There is perhaps a certain inadequacy in this way of talking about partial Erlebnisse. Husserl wrote: 
“[Stream of Erlebnisse or of consciousness] is an essential referentiality of succession 
[Aufeinanderbezogenheit] or a belongingness-together, it is not a whole made of parts, it is an absolute 
unity...” (Hua XIV, p. 46). But with “partial Erlebnisse” I do not refer to single Erlebnisse detached from 
its place in the temporal flux, but to moments that give an Erlebnis its main character (as pain, etc.), 
even though they are not the complete or full Erlebnis (they are lived together with perception, feelings, 
and all kind of horizons, habitualities, etc.). 
23 As has been brought to light by Roberto Walton in “El lenguaje y lo trascendental” (in Husserl. Mundo, 
conciencia y temporalidad, Buenos Aires: Editorial Almagesto, 1993, pp. 171-193; cf. specially section 3, 
“La estética trascendental”, pp. 184-191). 
24 Cf. César Moreno Márquez, La intención comunicativa. Ontología e intersubjetividad en la fenomeno-
logía de Husserl, Sevilla: Thémata. Suplementos, Serie Mayor 1, 1989, a study of whose main intention I 
feel particularly close, as I try to show later. See also section 4. “Apofántica e intersubjetividad” in the 
book of Walton mentioned in the previous note.  
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words, the issue of the role of the I as the I of its acts. Linguistic expression is 
a dimension of active life; but it occurs in the middle of a stream of passive 
life... How the I engages in expression is a facet of the issue of how it engages 
in its own life... Finally, in the subsoil of this issue is (as we already saw above 
in passing) also the triple issue of the individuation of the I, the individuation of 
its life (active or passive), and the individuation of its world: in one word, the 





From the consideration of the fact that all expression occurs in the middle 
of, or better, within an inexpressible stream of conscious life whose ineffability 
means an effective limit to language, we can move to the consideration of this 
very inexpressible life, in all its intricacy, as a horizon for linguistic expression, 
and a specific horizon of its own, that is, the linguistic horizon —but with 
complex intertwinements with many other horizons... I’ll try to show that this 
idea of an ineffable life being the horizon of linguistic expression is not only a 
game of concepts. 
The first thing that must be said is that this consideration of life in its 
intricacy as the horizon of, and for, the linguistic expression, can be developed 
in two aspects or trends (underlined here by the use of the two different 
propositions) that were defined in one of the early texts of Roberto Walton 
about the notion of horizon25: “On the one hand —Walton writes—, horizon 
implies merely an a priori frame of anticipation [...] On the other hand, horizon 
presents itself as a totality [...]”. 
Living intricacy is a totality of living sense (“transcendental subjectivity is 
the universe of possible sense”, to remember Husserl’s words)26, and as such it 
is the only possible field of and for possible meanings (or significations) of 
expressions27. This means that I can only transpose or “convert” into meanings 
of expressions (raise them to the sphere of the conceptual) senses of my own 
 
 
25 “Las dos vertientes de la noción fenomenológica de horizonte”, in Cuadernos de Filosofía, XVIII, 28-29 
(Buenos Aires, 1978), pp. 117-129. The following quotation in page 117. 
26 Hua I, § 41, p. 117. 
27 I adopt the distinction Husserl establishes in Ideas I (§ 124) between Sinn (translated as “sense”) and 
Bedeutung (translated as “signification”, like Kersten does, or as “meaning”, as is usual), and apply the 
first “to the whole noetic-noematic sphere” and the second “only to the linguistic sphere, that of ‘ex-
pressing’” (p. 294; Hua III/1, p. 285). 
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living experiences or Erlebnisse. This should not be disregarded as a triviality. It 
is a consequence of the exclusive accessibility that I have to my own 
Erlebnisse, but first of all without any kind of reflection, or at least any active 
reflection28. But it opens, therefore, the possibility of a reflection, that is, of a 
reflective way of expressing. To my view, Gadamer’s thesis that “no individual, 
when he speaks, has a true consciousness of his language”29 can only refer to 
an active self-consciousness, to an active reflection. It is undeniable that every 
true, active speaker, has a passive consciousness of his speaking, and this 
consciousness not only allows him to refer reflectively, at any moment, to his 
own speaking and the words he has just said, but also to execute an active 
reflection that can work before and along his speaking, or in general, along his 
(linguistic) expressing. 
In a still previous level of considerations, living intricacy, life (my life) as a 
totality or a total unity, is also the horizon of the acts of expression considered 
as one of the possibilities, among multiple others, that I have to act, to behave, 
to exercise my capacities and my freedom. Although the possibility, and 
respectively, the decision, to express linguistically (to speak, to write, etc.) at 
all, goes usually hand in hand with the “contents” of the expression —in “that” I 
express is already included “what” I express—, the possibility that it does not, 
the possibility of a breach among the two (as it happened, for instance, when I 
decided to speak in this conference without having any determinate idea of 
what I was going to say) makes clear that we have in fact, always, a double 
horizon of potentialities. Both horizons are present, in an almost 
indistinguishable way, whenever we actually express: “I can keep on speaking 
(or writing, etc.)”, and “I can say (or write, etc.) this or that...”.  But in fact, 
those different potentialities are in both cases potentialities of a single horizon: 
it is the horizon of the whole concrete situation in which I find myself, and it is 
formed or determined precisely by the actual living intricacy. This horizon of my 
situation includes in itself (and is not included by) the horizon that Husserl calls 
“situational horizon” which is “common to all” and implies a reference to a 
“typical similarity of situations”30. 
 
 
28 All questions concerning the “linguistic competence” fall exactly in this terrain. 
29 Verdad y método II. Trad. de Manuel Olasagasti, Salamanca: Sígueme, 1992, p. 149. 
30 Husserl writes (Hua XVII, p. 207): “all daily life of the individual and of community is referred to a 
typical similarity of situations, in such a way that everybody that puts itself in a certain situation has, as 
a normal man, the corresponding situational horizon, common to all. We can later explicate these hori-
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The horizon that is always working at this level of the “pre-reflective” 
expression reveals its anticipatory character in certain situations in which it, or 
something “from it”, invites or provokes reflection (and here also, possibly, in 
the double aspect of the “that” and of the “what”, but most frequently in the 
last one). Sometimes, it happens that I don’t know what to tell (or what to 
write) because I don’t know exactly what I think or what I feel, and I look for it 
in myself before speaking (or writing). Something from the intricacy makes 
itself felt, in a fleeting and blurry way, but with clear anticipatory evidence, as 
pertinent, or clarifying, or revealing, or deep... I make a stop in my discourse 
or talk and for an instant I dig in myself to find out, to see it better31. This 
experience, and the kind of incidental reflection that it provokes, is anything 
unusual in daily use of language. It occurs frequently in (almost) all linguistic 
communication. Its interest lies in that it reveals at the same time the 
participation or the hidden presence of the non-actual intricacy in actual life, as 
an implicit and, so to say, “vigilant” horizon, and the reflexivity of subjective life 
—in Husserl’s sense, which is not at all restricted to active reflection. Husserl 
writes: 
 
[...][T]he decisive step is not really performed, [...] when the “reflexivity” of the life 
of consciousness that lies in the essence of intentionality, which grows in countless 
configurations, in levels, and continuously iterating itself, is not understood. It lies 
already in every continual retentional modification, in higher level already in the 
protentional horizon-formation that goes hand in hand with it. It lies in every 
recollection and anticipation and in plurality in every apperception, in almost 
vertiginous multiplicity of intentional implications and reciprocal references of these 





zons, but constitutive intentionality referred to the horizon, thanks to which the surrounding world of 
daily life is a world of experience, exists always before it is exposed by the subject of reflection; this 
intentionality determines essentially the sense of occasional judgments, surpassing always what, in each 
case, words themselves say and can say expressly and with precision”. Gadamer has also referred to a 
“situational horizon” for all enunciations; cf. Verdad y método II, pp. 59-60. 
31 Gendlin calls this a “felt sense”, a “felt meaning”, or an “experienced meaning”. This notion has a key 
role in the development both of the theory and practice of “Focusing” and a peculiar research on lan-
guage. See mainly Gendlin’s Experience and the Creation of Meaning. A Philosophical and Psychological 
Approach to the Subjective (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997; 1st. ed. 1962, The Free 
Press of Glencoe), and Focusing (New York/Toronto/London/Sydney/Auckland: Bantam Books, 1981; 1st 
ed. 1978, Everest House). See also David Michael Levin, ed., Language Beyond Postmodernism, Saying 
and Thinking in Gendlin’s Philosophy, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997. 
32 Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass, Dritter Teil: 1929-1935 (Hua 
XV). Edited by Iso Kern, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, p. 543-544. 
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Reflexivity, then, is passively operating within the intricacy. Even if it is 
always there, it is not at all strange that it manifests itself in actual life more 
clearly or frequently during the process of linguistic expression, when life is 
precisely seeking expression33. But it lies in the freedom of a subject to give to 
active reflection, which usually has only a cursory or incidental intervention in 
linguistic expression, a more frequent, sustained, and oriented participation. Of 
course, it is not something to be recommended for all linguistic praxis, because 
linguistic praxis has, regularly, a certain rhythm and a certain cadency that 
there is no reason to alter. Active reflection is not normally performed aloud, 
and it always needs some time. The pauses in which it is carried through may 
mean intolerable fractures in most linguistic situations. On the contrary, in 
other situations they are not only desirable for general or common sense 
reasons, as for instance while writing a theoretical essay —where reflective 
pauses are more than desirable even if they go against the rush of our 
contemporary academic life—, but may mean a truly enrichment of the 
situation itself and, therefore, of the lives of those engaged in them (their 
language included). Perhaps the main instances are those cases where the 
theme of the linguistic expression (of a conversation or any other dialogical 
situation) is the very life of those involved in it (what they themselves think, 
feel, hope, wish, fear, etc., etc.). The assured ineffability of both lives in a so-
called “intimate” conversation, even in the extremely rare cases in which it is 
felt, is not a real obstacle for the adoption of a reflective attitude directed each 
one towards his/her own respective living intricacy, which is, effectively, the 
horizon of the conversation and the only possible source of any possible sense 
that it can raise to language. Pauses allow, as Gendlin puts it, to speak from 
the intricacy, and, thanks to it, to carry it, and the conversation, forward, 
which, in other terms, would mean to have a better fulfillment of the 
communicative intention, which involves, of course, the intentions of both 
partners directed to a mutual understanding34. 
 
 
33 I think that Husserl’s descriptions allow to say even that there is at work in linguistic expression a kind 
of reflexivity, just because in it conscious life must come to itself (to the senses of the Erlebnisse in the 
substratum “to be expressed”) and modify itself in a peculiar way. This claim, however, must be very 
carefully sustained in analytic and descriptive evidences before putting it in the arena against well-
known thesis of hermeneutics or postmodernism. 
34 In the development of his notion of a “dialogical praxis”, César Moreno alludes to certain notions like 
“listening” or the “patience of listening” from Blanchot and Levinas that, if they were given a solid phe-
nomenological background, would certainly be in line with my intentions. See Moreno, op. cit., p. 324.  
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In the context of communicative praxis, or in any form of linguistic 
expression, another horizon, or perhaps I should say, another family of 
horizons can be noted, which form in an interesting way the reverse of the 
horizon of the living intricacy just exposed. It is the language of the speaker or 
the user himself that forms a horizon for him in its institutionalization as a 
langue (in the sense of Saussure)35, but only as far as it is known or can be 
deemed by the user himself as accessible for him. In this respect, a writer 
surrounded by all sorts of dictionaries has a much more ample and varied 
horizon than an average speaker in a coffee shop. A peculiar interplay of both 
horizons, the horizon of the intricacy and the horizon of language, is 
established, where the coming of the senses to be expressed and the coming of 
the words that will express them usually fuse in one and the same coming; but 
there are times, not at all infrequent, where a more or less detained reflection 
is needed. We referred to this situation in relation with the first horizon. Harry 
P. Reeder has referred36 to the same situation regarding mainly the second 
horizon (but also to the interplay of both of them) in the experience of seeking 
a word (or other sorts of expressions) from a lived, or experienced signitive 
intention (thus, a gendlinian “felt meaning”). In his exploration, he proposes 
and makes use of the notion of semantic texture as an ontological property of 
our linguistic life, of which horizon and anticipation are key features. But, in 
spite of their interest, here I cannot do to these contributions by Reeder the 
justice they deserve37. 
But the horizon of issues that must remain pending is really huge. Of 
course it was not my task here to deal with the most universal problems of 
 
 
35 “Furthermore, subject is conscious —in the way of a horizon— of his own language while speaking.” 
(Harry Reeder and Germán Vargas Guillén, Ser y sentido. Hacia una fenomenología hermenéutica, Bo-
gotá: San Pablo, 2009, p. 106). 
36 See Reeder, “Signitive Intention and Semantic Texture”, in Husserl Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2004), pp. 
183-206, and “Living Words and Concepts: Semantic Space and Semantic Texture”, in Phenomenology 
2005: Selected Essays from North America (Bucharest: ZetaBooks, 2007, electronic publication), pp. 
535-559. See also Reeder and Vargas, op. cit. 
37 In Reeder and Vargas, op. cit., p. 126, they also remember some hermeneutical theses that are perti-
nent in this context: that it is experience itself who searches and finds the words that express it; that 
linguistic horizons that surrounds us do not confine us or bind us, but the horizons of a living language 
are always open; that, even if every subject is embedded culturally in a language, the linguistic compe-
tence deployed while speaking allows its modification. (See Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd. ed. New York: Continuum, 1993, pp. 261-262, 302-304, 357, 
457.) Gadamer has also highlighted the importance of conversation for philosophical thought, and even 
if he denies explicitly an sphere of the unsayable juxtaposed to the sphere of the sayable (“nothing” —he 
writes— “can be subtracted radically to the act of ‘saying’ because even a simple allusion alludes to 
something”), he allows, in a more Husserlian, monadological vein, for experiences of dialogue where the 
different individual and nontransferable points of view, each one reflecting the entire world, gather in the 
same and identical world. (Gadamer, Verdad y método II, pp. 115 and 206.) 
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horizonticity as something that affects or inheres in every Erlebnis. But perhaps 
there are interesting considerations to make about the way in which the horizon 
or series or horizons of the expressed Erlebnis are “communicated”, as it were, 
to its linguistic expression, as a non-productive stratum that preserves the 
position-taking of the expressed stratum. I think in the horizons related to the 
process of evidencing, or, to use Walton’s terms, of “rational legitimation”38. We 
mention first, in connection with perception, the linguistic horizon offered, so to 
say, by its perceptive background, by the “halo” of background-intuitions or 
background seeings, to use Husserl words39. It is perhaps this horizon the one 
Husserl has in mind when he says: “Everything determined more precisely in 
the unity of expression is itself again expressed universally”40, a remark that 
closes any hope of reaching the entire individuality of the object through new 
expressions, but that opens the very possibility, which lies in the horizon that I 
am recalling, of a more precise determination of the object, be it in more 
detailed expressions of the same perception and its horizons or in expressions 
of new perceptions. In a certain relation with it, we also have as another 
linguistic horizon the one formed by the mere possibility of expressing those 
modifications of the perception-substratum, like its relative clarity and 
distinctness, that cannot be expressed while it is expressed. Nothing prevents, I 
guess, that they be converted into noematic cores of new Erlebnisse and 
thereby be expressed. I can talk about the blurriness of my perception of the 
blackbird, etc. 
On other hand, the horizon which brings with it the possibility of a more 
precise determination of the object, extends as typical horizon of rationality to 
all practical life: in countless situations we need to see better, or to see more, 
in order to be able to tell something more precise about the perceived. This 
horizon of evidencing can also be directly seen in the sphere of expression, as 
represented by the words: “I can say again what I said”, with the two main 
variations: “I can repeat what I said” (“I can say it again with the same words”) 
and “I can say in a different manner what I said”. The intentionality of linguistic 
expression is directed to its proper fulfillment, quite apart the fulfillment of the 
 
 
38 See his article “Conciencia de horizonte y legitimación racional”, in Revista Venezolana de Filosofía, 
No. 20, 1985, pp. 87-110. 
39 Ideas I, § 35, p. 70. 
40 Ibid., § 126, p. 300. 
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substratum, and it has its own rational teleology: “I can say (or write, etc.) 
what I said better”, etc. 
Of course, to see the full interest of talking about the horizons of linguistic 
expression, we must leave perception and consider the full range of the life of 
consciousness. And it is also indispensable not to see expression as a dead 
stratum that only reflects what happens in the basic strata of that life. Or, 
better said, I hope, the basic strata do not remain unaffected by what happens 
in the stratum of expression. Expression is itself an Erlebnis, an act, and it is 
part of the same stream of Erlebnisse than the ones that are expressed. It 
responds to intentions, purposes, position-takings, that are carried in the basic 
strata, and it affects and have repercussions on this basic strata and in the 
whole stream. Therefore, for instance, a failure in expression, or, with the more 
technical term, a deception of a expression, gives rise, or may give rise, to a 
whole tumult of Erlebnisse, and a very intricate indeed (with elements of 
reflection, memory, anger, remorse, fantasy, expectation, wishing, thinking, 
etc.), but all this according to the peculiar intricacy of the living situation. The 
horizons of expression, thus, intermingle with the horizons of the rest of the life 
of consciousness. In this light, “I can say better what I said” is just a core that 
could be surrounded by something like “I can find better words to say again 
what I tried to say”, but also, at the same time, “I can and I must think better 
what I am going to say”, and also, “I can and must see better into the things 
before I dare to say again something to correct what I said”, and in both cases 
we could add the note “... so next time I won’t disappoint Tom, Dick or Harry, 
and I won’t feel again this shame in front of them and in front of myself...”, 
etcetera, etcetera. 
 
